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Abstract: 
In everyday language, we readily attribute experiences to groups. For example, one might say, 
“Spain celebrated winning the European Cup” or “The uncovering of corruption caused the 
union to think long and hard about its internal structure.” In each case, the attribution makes 
sense. However, it is quite difficult to give a non-reductive account of precisely what these 
statements mean because in each case a mental state is ascribed to a group, and it is not obvious 
that groups can have mental states. In this article, I do not offer an explicit theory of collective 
experience. Instead, I draw on phenomenological analyses and empirical data in order to provide 
general conditions that a more specific theory of collective experience must meet in order to be 
coherent. 
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Introduction: 
 
It is commonplace in our everyday language to attribute experiences to groups themselves. For 
example, one might say, “Spain celebrated winning the European Cup;” “The market was 
shocked at the failure of the tech giant’s IPO;” or “The uncovering of corruption caused the 
union to think long and hard about its internal structure.” In each case, the attribution makes 
sense. Almost no one is confused as to what they mean. However, when one attempts to explain 
precisely what one of these statements means, it is not unusual to feel like Augustine who, trying 
to explain the nature of time, said, “I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks 
me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled” (1961, p. 264). After all, 
celebrating requires certain kinds of mental states; Spain is a nation, and it is not at all obvious 
that nations have mental states. What, then, is meant by such strange statements? 
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Recent years have seen a surge in phenomenological research in the areas of social 
cognition and social ontology (Chant, Hindriks, & Preyer, 2014; Chelstrom, 2013, Gallagher, 
2008; Stueber, 2006; & Zahavi, 2011). Themes in this research include such topics as the nature 
and structure of interpersonal understanding, or empathy, the possibility of group agency, 
collective intentionality, and shared emotions, to name a few. At the same time, there is no 
shortage of scientific interest in the physiological mechanisms that drive, or underlie, feelings of 
empathy, communality, and solidarity (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; deVignemont & Singer, 2006; 
Gallese & Goldman, 1998, Hove & Risen, 2009; Jackson, Rainville, & Decety, 2006; Singer & 
Lamm, 2009; & Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2011;). Furthermore, there is a long tradition of inter-
disciplinary dialogue between phenomenology, psychology, and the cognitive sciences, 
especially since Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the Schneider case in Phenomenology of Perception 
(2002, especially pp. 112-170). In keeping with this tradition, the goal of this article is to 
combine the phenomenological insights of Edith Stein’s analyses of communal experience, with 
the findings of a recent study of a Spanish fire-walking ritual in an effort to clarify the curious 
case of collective experience. 
While much is written in contemporary analytic philosophy on the questions of what it 
means for two or more people to act together (Gilbert, 1989, 2014; Bratman, 1993, 2014; Searle, 
1995, 2010 ; List & Pettit, 2011), and some such research is attuned to the phenomenological 
tradition (especially Schmid, 2009), there is no consensus on what it means to say that a group 
acts together. However, acting together is, I take it, only one kind of experience we attribute to 
groups. As I noted above, we also say groups celebrated and were shocked, to name just a few. 
In addition, there is little to no consensus on which, if any, of the aforementioned theories are 
reconcilable. To achieve such a consensus, and to fully determine the compatibility of the 
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aforementioned theories, is beyond the scope of this article. Therefore, I will not attempt it. 
Instead, the goal of this article is to survey the terrain from the point of view of a 
phenomenological analysis of communal experience and use this as a tool to interpret the 
findings of an empirical study of a collective ritual. This article will succeed if it is able to 
identify general conditions, both phenomenologically and empirically grounded, which any 
theory of collective experience must meet in order to be coherent. If our theories are to vindicate 
the common sense convictions that our everyday language expresses, we must be able to 
adjudicate theories of collective experience. Not just any explanation or theory will do. This 
article seeks to lay the groundwork necessary for such research going forward.  
 
What makes a communal experience communal? 
I begin somewhat at the end, by trying to answer the question, “What makes a communal 
experience communal?” I have identified the following six proposals that might answer this 
question. 
(i) Each member of the group has the experience as an individual.  
(ii) Some subset of the group has the experience. 
(iii) The experience is given in consciousness with a specifically communal sense 
(Sinn). 
(iv) The experience is given in consciousness as belonging to a stream of 
consciousness which is the “communal stream.” 
(v) There is some ontologically independent entity, a super-individual subject, whose 
experiences are those of the community. 
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(vi) Some logically consistent combination of (i) through (v) as sufficient, necessary, 
or jointly sufficient and necessary conditions. 
 
Before I proceed, I wish to clarify what I take each of these proposals to claim. One way 
to endorse the first proposal is just to define the group in terms of the experience. For example, 
every person present in a seminar would constitute a group simply by their being present in the 
lecture theater at the time of the seminar. Anyone not present is, eo ipso, not a member of the 
group. One might also endorse (i) by refusing to admit any experience as communal until every 
member of the group has undergone it. In this way, rites of initiation would be an example of a 
communal experience since, by definition, group membership is contingent upon having 
experienced the ritual. The second proposal claims that a particular subset of the group must 
have an experience in order for it to count as a communal experience. That subset might be 
identifiable by role played within the group, or be a critical mass in terms of a percentage of the 
overall group population. Whose having the experience is necessary, or the requisite size of the 
subset, may vary depending on the nature of the group in question. The third proposal suggests 
that there may be some qualitative property of the experience itself that identifies it as being 
shared or belonging to the community. The fourth proposal requires there to be a stream of 
experience, not the individual’s, but to which the individual has access, and properly speaking, 
this stream belongs to the community. Endorsing the fifth proposal commits one to saying that 
groups are the kinds of ontological entities about which one may speak in terms of subjectivity 
proper. By this, I mean that if (v) is true, then we should be able to say something about the 
group qua subjectivity, minimally that it has a first-person perspective on experiences that it calls 
its own, and that perspective is unified in immanent time within a singular subject. Finally, the 
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sixth proposal simply asserts that more than one of these proposals might be true at once so long 
as there is no contradiction involved.
1
   
The remainder of this article aims to determine whether the combined force of 
phenomenology and quantitative social psychology can shed light on the prospects of the 
aforementioned proposals. I begin with an explication of Edith Stein’s phenomenology of 
communal experience and then turn to a field study of Spanish fire-walking ritual. It is my claim 
that these two resources can help us confirm some of the above proposals and eliminate others in 
an effort to get closer to clarifying what it actually means to attribute an experience to a 
community. 
 
Edith Stein’s Phenomenology of Community 
Edith Stein completed her dissertation on the topic of empathy under Edmund Husserl in 1916 at 
the University of Freiburg (Stein, 1989). She went on to serve as his research assistant from 
1917-1918. During that time, she edited his lectures on time consciousness and worked to 
prepare volumes two and three of Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a 
Phenomenological Philosophy for publication.
2
 Though she is probably most well known for her 
work on empathy, in 1922, she published two essays in the fifth volume of Husserl’s Jahrbuch 
für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung. They were entitled “Sentient Causality” and 
                                                 
1
 The only potential contradiction immediately obvious to me is that  (i) and (ii) might be inconsistent. 
However, it may be possible, if one defines the subset properly, for (i) and (ii) to be co-instantiated. For example, I 
can imagine a group consisting of two people, one of whom is the president of the group and the other the vice 
president. I can further imagine one claiming that the necessary subset of the group who must have the experience in 
order for it to could as communal consists of the president and vice president of said group. In this instance, both (i) 
and (ii) would be true at the same time. 
2
 The second and third volumes of Ideas were never published during Husserl’s lifetime. The lectures on 
time consciousness were published. However, when they did, Martin Heidegger took full credit as their editor, 
thanking Stein for her help in transcribing the manuscript. It is now clear to scholars that he published her version 
without making any substantial changes. For more information, see Calcagno, 2014, pp. 5-6.  
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“Individual and Community.”3 These twin treatises bore the subtitle, “Contribution to the 
Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities.” These works, when considered alongside her 
dissertation and 1925 publication, An Investigation Concerning the State (Stein, 2007), comprise 
a comprehensive social and political philosophy that is beginning to draw a great deal more 
attention in the last decade. “Individual and Community” is of the most interest to this article 
because within it she develops detailed phenomenological theories of collective intentionality, 
social acts, and the nature of social groups. 
In order to grasp Stein’s phenomenological analysis of communal experience, we must 
understand her starting point. She begins her analysis of community “from within.” By this, I 
mean that she assumes we are all members of some community or another and that we have 
experiences as members of those communities. She then brings the tools of phenomenology to 
bear on those experiences in order to reveal their common essence. This is to be contrasted with 
the typical starting point of her admittedly more prominent teacher, Edmund Husserl, who begins 
with the intentional structures of individuals and then proceeds to investigate how those 
structures can become interwoven with others so that a community emerges (See Husserl, 1973, 
pp. 218ff.; Husserl, 1988, p. 22; & Husserl, 2001, pp. 543ff). I see nothing wrong, in principle, 
with either approach, but I do believe that Stein’s has the advantage of being more accessible to 
her readers. 
 Her investigation into the “question of how it’s possible to have a community as a higher-
level subject of life and a community life” begins with the comparison of individual and 
communal experience (Stein, 2000, p. 132). As for the individual, her conscious life is isolated, 
                                                 
3
 These two works are collected into one volume in her collected works. See Stein, E. (2000). Philosophy of 
psychology and the humanities. Washington D.C.: ICS Publications. 
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in terms of direct access, from the conscious life of every other individual.
4
 She writes, “What 
flows out of one ego belongs to one current of consciousness, which is isolated unto itself and 
walled off from every other, just like the ego is” (2000, p. 133). However, despite this 
“inalienable aloneness,” the individual ego is capable of entering into a “community of life” with 
other egos, and in so doing, “the individual subject becomes a member of a super-individual 
subject” (Stein, 2000, p. 133).  
 Thus, Stein clearly believes that there are super-individual subjects of some kind, and we 
may now turn to her analysis of these subjects by considering her example. She asks us to 
compare being a member of a military unit that is grieving over the loss of its commander to 
grieving over the death of a personal friend (Stein, 2000, p. 134). Her analysis of this example 
will shed light on precisely what she takes communal experience to be. She writes, “we see that 
the two cases differ in several respects: (1) the subject of the experiencing is different; (2) there’s 
another composition to the experience; (3) there’s a different kind of experiential current that the 
experience fits into” (Stein, 2000, p. 134). In what follows, I will use Stein’s analysis of these 
three differences, in turn, as a guide for getting to the heart of communal experience.  
 First, let us examine the subject of communal experience. As a member of the military 
unit whose leader has been killed, the grief that I feel over this loss is not mine alone as it would 
be if I were to grieve over the loss of a personal friend. In such an example of communal grief, 
we have “a subject in our case that encompasses a plurality of individual egos. Certainly I the 
individual ego am filled up with grief. But I feel myself to be not alone with it. Rather I feel it as 
our grief” (Stein, 2000, p. 134). On the face of it, this appears to soften her stance vis-à-vis the 
                                                 
4
 I say it is isolated in terms of direct access because Stein does argue that we have a kind of indirect access 
to the mental lives of others. This is her theory of empathy (Einfühlung). I will return to empathy below. However, a 
full consideration of Stein’s treatment of empathy would take us well beyond the scope of this paper. See Stein, 
1989.   
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“inalienable aloneness” of individual egos that we saw above. How can a communal subject 
encompass a plurality of individual egos if they are isolated from one another? In order to 
understand Stein’s claim about the communal subject, we must compare it with her 
understanding of the individual. When she speaks of the individual subject, she distinguishes 
“the pure ego, that is, the quality-less point of radiation of the experiences, from the personality, 
the constituted unity of personal properties” (2000, p. 135). This distinction is useful in 
understanding what Stein means by a communal subject. She insists that there is no communal 
pure ego; however, there “very well could be a collective personality as that whose experiences 
the communal experiences are to be regarded as” (2000, p. 135). 
 Stein’s insistence that there is no communal ego reveals a two-fold commitment, first to 
the ontological separateness of individual egos, and second to the non-independence of the 
communal subject. We saw above, but it bears repeating, that individual egos are distinct from 
one another in terms of the inviolable separateness of their conscious lives. Experience is given 
originarily only to the very subject to whom it belongs, and there is no path by which I may trace 
my experiences to your ego or to a super-individual ego in which you and I share originary 
experiences. This speaks to the second point. She clearly insists that there is no ontologically 
separate communal ego. When we have communal experience, “we feel in the name of the 
community, and it's the community's experiencing that is carried out in us and through us” 
(Stein, 2000, p. 139). Only individuals have experiences. An individual has a group experiences 
in the name of the group.  
What, then, is the communal subject? To answer this question requires us to examine the 
noetic and noematic correlates of communal experience. Let us consider again the example of 
the grieving military unit. The subject of the experience, Stein tells us, is different. How so? 
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There is a sense in which experiences, vis-à-vis their mode of givenness, refer back to their 
subjects. Those experiences which are given to me in the first person perspective are mine. The 
individual subject is the noetic correlate of this sense implicit in the first-person givenness of 
experience. Upon closer examination, it turns out that some experiences that are given to me in 
the first-person form also imply other subjects. They are given in the first-person plural. Some of 
my experiences carry an implicit reference to a multiplicity of subjects. This is what Stein means 
when, speaking of the grief experienced as a member of the unit, she writes, “I feel it as our 
grief. The experience is essentially colored by the fact that others are taking part in it, or even 
more, by the fact that I take part in it only as a member of a community” (2000, p. 134). 
Communal experiences possess an essential noetic sense implying ownership by several subjects. 
As the individual subject is the subjective correlate of first-person singular experiences, the 
communal subject is the subjective correlate of first-personal plural experiences. 
The second difference between individual and communal experience that Stein notes is 
that “the composition of the experience is different” (2000, p. 134). We have already seen, on the 
noetic side, how this is the case. However, there is a different noematic composition of 
communal experiences as well. The experiencing of every experience is private – thus, the ego’s 
inalienable aloneness – but communal experience possesses a distinctive noematic feature. Stein 
writes, “It has a sense, and by virtue of that sense it claims to count for something lying beyond 
the private experiencing, something subsisting objectively, through which it is rationally 
substantiated” (2000, p. 135-136). The object of communal experience possesses a noematic 
sense that qualifies it as a shared content. Of course, the individual experiencing differs from 
person to person. Stein speaks of a “private veneer” that surrounds the shared core of communal 
experience (2000, p. 136). For example, I may grieve the loss of our commander more acutely 
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than you do. Still, “the sense-content of each of the individual experiences applying to this 
correlate is idealiter the same, notwithstanding the private veneer that encloses it at any given 
time” (Stein, 2000, p. 136). There is a single noematic sense to the experience that is shared 
between us. 
The shared sense content that constitutes the communal grief aims toward the fully 
motivated experience of the community. Let me explain. What counts for the complete 
intentional content of a communal experience is a difficult question, one that Stein’s analysis 
raises but does not fully answer. It will be helpful to make a distinction here. There are two 
questions one may ask vis-à-vis communal experience: 1) What must individual experiences be 
like if they are to be considered shared, or communal?; and 2) How is the object of communal 
experience constituted? In response to the first question, Stein identifies plural noetic and 
noematic senses of experience that are ideally the same between subjects. Individual experiences 
with these senses count as shared. To put it slightly differently, if Tom and Gina each have an 
individual experience of event E, and their consciousness of E contains a plural noetic correlate 
implicating both Tom and Gina as subjects, and if a shared noematic sense marks the 
composition of the object of E, then Tom and Gina may be said to share an experience. 
The second question is more difficult to answer. The full content of the communal grief is 
a constituted unity. “We feel the grief as something belonging to the unit, and in the fact that 
we’re doing that, through this grief we’re calling for the grief of the unit to be realized” (Stein, 
2000, p. 137). And, the constitution of this communal grief is an intersubjective affair; “a whole 
series of current of consciousness contributes to its coalescence” (Stein, 2000, p. 136). 
Furthermore, the constitution of the communal content takes time. “It isn’t something 
instantaneous. It develops in a continuity of experiencing during an interval and shows all sorts 
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of qualitative fluctuations within its unity” (Stein, 2000, p. 136). The noematic intentional 
correlate of the communal experience is constituted out of individual experiences of the group’s 
members, those implied in the subjective/noetic correlate, and the content of the communal 
noema undergoes changes as it receives more and more input. Just as the intentional object of 
visual perception changes as the experience is deepened, when, for example, I walk around the 
object and examine it more closely, so too the intentional content of communal experience 
fluctuates as more and more members contribute to its coalescence. As with any object of 
consciousness, its full constitution may be an open-ended project since there are always infinitely 
more perspectives to be gained. 
 So far, Stein has portrayed communal experience as having characteristic noetic and 
noematic senses. Its noetic sense refers it, in terms of ownership, back to a plurality of 
experiencing subjects. The noematic sense of the communal experience is marked with a special 
shared sense (Sinn), and the full communal content is a constituted unity. This shared sense, 
Stein insists, must be accessible in principle to any member of the community (2000, p. 136). 
Given these qualifications, one can conclude that all that is required for a “community” to have 
an experience is for at least one member of the community to realize the fully motivated sense 
content in her experience. This strikes an odd tone, and so, Stein’s elaboration on this point is 
worth quoting in full. 
If none of the members feels the appropriate grief, then you've got to say that the loss 
isn’t correctly appreciated by the unit. If even one member has realized within himself 
the rationally required sense-content, then that no longer holds: there the one is feeling 
“in the name of the unit,” and in him the unit has satisfied the claim placed upon it. The 
experiences of the others aren’t eliminated by this. They all share in the assembling of the 
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communal experience; but that which was intended in all of them came to fulfillment in 
the experience of this one alone (2000, pp. 136-137). 
 
Just so long as one member of the community realizes, within her own stream of consciousness, 
the properly motivated communal senses (noetic and noematic), the community may be said to 
have the experience. On the other hand, if none of the members of the military unit were to have 
the appropriate grief – if, for example, each grieved only over what the loss meant to her 
personally – then the community would fail to have the experience. 
 I would now like to turn to the third and final difference between communal and 
individual experiences Stein indicates. The experiences fit into a different kind of experiential 
current. Stein writes, “we can justifiably talk about one experiential current of the community” 
(2000, p. 140). This may come as a shock given what we saw above. For example, she is clear 
that “A community-subject, as analog of the pure ego, does not exist” (Stein, 2000, p. 135). She 
adds later that, “this ‘communal consciousness’ of ours doesn't constitute any super-individual 
communal consciousness, as private experiencing and its content constitute a super-individual 
experiencing and a super-individual content” (Stein, 2000, p. 139). She attempts to walk the line 
that asserts the reality of the community’s stream of experiences while denying the existence of a 
communal stream of consciousness.  
 In her descriptions of the individual ego, both in On The Problem of Empathy and up to 
this point in “Individual and Community,” she did not need to distinguish between the current of 
experience and the current of consciousness. It was unnecessary, she claims, because here “the 
term consciousness in the usual manner of speaking extended from the moment of the 
experience” (2000, p. 140). In the individual, the current of consciousness is identical with the 
current of experiences. The use of the aqueous metaphor to describe the stream of consciousness 
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is traceable to its principle of unity. A stream of consciousness is a stream because the 
experiences it comprises are connected in a continual flowing such that the experiencing subject 
may trace them back to her experiencing ego. In other words, all the experiences in the stream of 
consciousness are her experiences, and the pure ego is the principle of unity of that stream. The 
same cannot be said for the communal current of experience and its unity. Stein writes, “But with 
communal experience we have to distinguish strictly: here there’s no current of consciousness as 
an originally constitutive flow” (2000, p. 140). Like the communal content discussed above, the 
communal current of experiences is a constituted unity. It is closer to a personality than it is to a 
unified stream of consciousness. 
 This fits with what Stein says about the experiencing of the communal subject. The 
community has experiences but is not self-conscious. “The community becomes conscious of 
itself only in us” (Stein, 2000, p. 139). She writes, “[T]here can’t be any self-supporting 
communal consciousness, any more than there’s a communal life that constitutes” (Stein, 2000, 
p. 140). She goes on to add, “Accordingly, we won’t be allowed to talk about any 
‘consciousness’ of the community in the strict sense” (Stein, 2000, p. 140). Only individuals are 
self-conscious subjects. The difference between an individual and a communal current of 
experiences is a constitutional one. The communal differs from the individual “through the fact 
that, as to its constitution, it refers back to the original conscious life of a plurality of subjects” 
(Stein, 2000, p. 140). We saw this above with the identification of the communal subject as the 
subjective correlate of experiences given in the first-person plural. Communal experiences are 
constituted on their noetic and noematic sides with respect to their being experienced and to their 
content, and the result of these constitutive functions is a unified current of experiences that, 
properly speaking, belongs to the community. 
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 The communal current of experience does not permeate the individual current. If it did, 
there would be no distinguishing between the two. Rather, “what the individual experiences as a 
member of the community forms the material out of which the communal experiences coalesce,” 
and the same extends to the coalescence of the communal current in the individual current (Stein, 
2000, p. 141). The communal current of experience is a constituted current of experience that has 
its place within individual streams of consciousness. There is a stream of consciousness that is 
the individual’s conscious life, and there are many experiential currents in that stream. Each of 
our streams of consciousness contains both individual currents and group currents. The group 
currents of experience are constituted out of those individual experiences with group 
significance. Those experiences are marked on both the noetic and noematic sides with an 
essential communal sense. On the noetic side, this sense implies the givenness of the experience 
to a plurality of subjects. The subjective correlate of this noetic sense is the communal subject. 
On the noematic side, there is an essential sense of the intentional object’s belonging to the 
community. The experiences of the community are connected by the sharing of these senses. The 
communal subject constitutes those experiences with these essential traits into a whole and the 
ideal correlate of this constituted unity is the communal current of experience. 
 One important question is this: what enables the cohesion of the communal current of 
experience? Though Stein does not give a direct answer to this question, I will attempt one on 
her behalf. First, the repeated noetic and noematic senses themselves function as a kind of 
cohesion amongst disparate communal experiences. The identity of the plural noetic and 
noematic references unifies these experiences across time. In a manner similar to the way in 
which the first-person givenness of my experiences unify my current of experience, the first-
person plural givenness of communal experiences unifies them. As I have put it elsewhere, if 
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experiences E1 and E2 are had at time t1 and t2 respectively, provided that E1 and E2 possess 
the same first-person plural correlate, they are united in some sense (Burns, 2015, p. 543). Or, 
there is a we-mode of experiencing, as Raimo Tuomela and others have expressed this point, that 
unifies communal experience (Cf. Tuomela, 2007, pp. 13-45).
5
 Those experiences with the same 
we-reference, are unified in some important sense. Of course, we must admit that some 
communal currents of experience will be more cohesive than others. Some will be strongly 
unified, others will likely be weak and fragmentary. Though Stein does not state this, I believe 
she would be committed to the notion that the more solidarity there is amongst members of the 
community, the deeper their intersubjective bonds, and the more openly and naively they live 
together while allowing the concerns of the others to become their own, the more cohesive the 
communal current of experience will be. 
 Before proceeding to consider the fire-walking ritual, I would be remiss if I were to 
ignore Stein’s account of empathy and its relation to communal experience. Although the term 
empathy (Einfühlung) appears only twice in the body of Philosophy of Psychology and the 
Humanities, as an intentional structure of experience, it makes a fundamental contribution to 
communal experience.  
 By empathy, Stein means “acts in which foreign experience (fremdes Erleben) is 
comprehended” (1989, p. 6). In an act of empathy, one subject undergoes another subject’s 
experiences, as other. For example, a friend tells me of the loss of his brother in war. I become 
aware of the pain of his loss in “the pained countenance” (Stein, 1989, p. 6). Stein insists that this 
experience of the other’s pain is not based on imitation, association, or inference from analogy – 
each of which were popular genetic theories of empathy in her day (Cf. 1989, pp. 22-27). Rather, 
                                                 
5
 I would like to borrow this way of speaking from Tuomela without committing myself to any of the 
particularities of his social ontology. However, there is a fruitful dialogue to be had here as well. Antonio Calcagno 
has begun just such a discussion (See Calcagno, 2014, pp. 127-30).   
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it is a sui generis form of perception (Stein, 1989, p. 11). There is a very real sense in which the 
conscious lives of other subjects are perceivable.  
Phenomenologically speaking, empathy belongs to the class of acts which are called 
apperceptions (Vergegenwärtigungen). Apperception is the name given to something that is 
perceived with or alongside another perception; it thus encompasses the concept of an empty 
intention and of a horizon (See Husserl, 2006, p. 83, n. 12). As such, all empathy is, for Stein, 
founded on the perception of the other’s body as a living body (1989, pp. 56-59). In other words, 
there are times when, as I perceive your body, I also directly perceive your conscious experience, 
albeit as yours. For example, when I see your face redden and your fist clinch, I see your anger in 
these things.   
 Rather than go into the full details of Stein’ original theory of empathy, I would like to 
restrict my considerations to how empathy makes communal experience both possible and 
meaningful. The first of these is, perhaps, the most obvious. Were it impossible to overcome the 
inalienable aloneness of my solitary experiencing, communal life would also be impossible. 
Empathy identifies the class of acts that make it possible for individuals to have a social life in 
the first place. Through empathy, I can allow your concerns to affect me and become important 
for me. Without it, there could be no we, only competing I’s. The possibility of pooling our 
collective power and putting it to work for us, the possibility of my accomplishing something 
beyond that of which I am individually capable, emerges from empathy. Without it, it is 
impossible for us to come together and constitute a community as a higher-order personality. 
 Empathy also makes communal experience meaningful. Recall that communal experience 
involves noetic and noematic senses that refer to both the subject and content of the experience 
as being plural. Furthermore, the fullest sense of communal experience involves the constitution 
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of the full communal sense content of the experience. The question of communal experience is 
not a question of numbers but of rationally motivated sense content. Empathy is the well-spring 
of this communal content. The communal experience is deepened as more and more subjects 
contribute to its coalescence, but it is deepened in each of our individual streams of 
consciousness, each of which are actively constituting the communal stream of experience. To 
return to the example of the grieving of the military unit, as you and I grieve in the name of the 
unit, I empathize with your grief and you empathize with mine. The content received in acts of 
empathy contributes to the overall meaning of the group’s grief and the constitution of the 
community’s grief as such. Empathy is the primary experience whereby we share rationally 
motivated sense content, thus making communal experiences meaningful.
6
 With these thoughts 
in mind, I now turn to the analysis of the Spanish fire-walking ritual. 
 
A Spanish Fire-Walking Ritual 
Collective rituals, which are present in almost all known societies, may offer a potential 
opportunity to study collective experience. Before I return to evaluate the six suggestions of how 
to account for  a communal experience, I would like to turn to an empirical study of a ritual that 
may help bolster the foregoing phenomenological analyses. In 2011, Konvalinka et al. published 
a study in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science in which they assessed 
synchronous physiological arousal during a fire-walking ritual, observed in San Pedro Manrique, 
Spain.  
 As a part of this ritual, a fire is stoked in a specially built arena. The fire consumes two 
tons of oak and is allowed to burn for four hours before it is reduced to a bed of hot coals, which 
                                                 
6
 Thanks to the anonymous reviewer of this article for this particular turn of phrase. 
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are burning at approximately 677 degrees Celsius when the walkers cross them. The ritual begins 
with a procession from the center of town. Those who will participate in the ceremony, 
musicians, and a large group of spectators proceed through town and into the arena, which holds 
approximately 3000 people. Aside from the fire walkers, those present at the event include 
locals, friends, family, and visitors. Once inside the arena, the spectators take their seats, the 
walkers dance around the coals for a few minutes before determining the order in which they will 
cross. They then take their seats to wait their turn. The fire walkers cross the coals one at a time, 
and many of them do so while carrying a loved one on their backs. Once across, their friends and 
families rush to congratulate them (Konvalinka et al., 2011, pp. 8514-8515). 
 The study included thirty-eight participants, twelve fire walkers, nine spectators who 
were friends or relatives of at least one fire walker, and seventeen spectators not related to any of 
the locals. Synchronous arousal between spectators and participants was compared using 
recurrence quantification analysis (RQA) and cross-recurrence quantification analysis (CRQA) 
on pairs. RQA and CRQA are non-linear mathematical methods that quantify how similarly two 
observed data series unfold over time, measuring the similarities of the trajectories of dynamical 
systems being compared. According to Fusaroli, Konvalinka, and Wallot, RQA “reconstructs the 
dynamical system underlying a time-series, maps its possible states and quantiﬁes the trajectory 
of the system through these states,” and CRQA “quantiﬁes how often the two systems display 
similar patterns of change or movement, and how complex the structure of the entrainment 
between their trajectories is” (2014, p. 139). RQA and CRQA thus show deeper similarities 
between data sets than mere correlations. 
 A brief word on why I find this study so compelling are in order before discussing its 
results. The first reason is that the participants and spectators have radically different bodily 
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behavior during the rite. In rituals where there is similar bodily behavior between participants 
and spectators, it would be more likely to observe similar physiological arousal due to said 
behavior. The second reason that I find this study so compelling is that it studies differences in 
synchronous arousal between related and non-related spectators. Therefore, if there is some 
significant difference in arousal patterns between these groups of spectators, it suggests that the 
reason for the difference must go beyond simple empathy based on neurological mirroring.  
 I now turn to the results of the study. Per Konvalinka et al.:  
Cross-recurrence plots were computed for three different pairs of participants: (i) related  
fire-walkers and spectators, (ii) tangentially related fire-walkers and spectators, whereby 
the spectators were related to one of the other walkers, and (iii) unrelated fire-walkers 
and spectators, whereby the spectators had no relation to anyone in the ritual. This 
allowed us to investigate how the ritual affected the group level and whether shared 
arousal was modulated by the level of relation (2011, p. 8516) 
Both RQA and CRQA showed similarities in the physiological arousal of the performers and the 
related spectators. However, neither showed patterns of similarity between performers and non-
related spectators. The CRQA analysis demonstrated fined grained “coupling of arousal patterns 
between fire-walkers and related spectators” (Konvalinka et al., 2011, p. 8518). What was found 
was not a simple correlated increase in heart rate between a fire walker and her spouse, as one 
might suspect. Rather, the data show that “there are shared patterns of arousal that span the fire-
walking ritual across all of the individual fire-walks, between performers and spectators that are 
related or tangentially related” (Konvalinka et al., 2011, p. 8517).  In other words, participants 
and related spectators shared deeply similar patterns of physiological arousal during the 
ceremony. However, unrelated spectators did not share these arousal patterns.  
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RQA analysis was used to measure similarity between participants and observers using 
four metrics: predictability, stability, complexity, and smoothness. The study revealed significant 
differences across all four metrics between related spectators and non-related spectators. 
However, the same tests failed to differentiate between participants and related spectators on 
three out of the four metrics (Konvalinka et al., 2011, p. 8516). It should be noted that the related 
spectators and the unrelated spectators had superficially similar experiences in that neither 
performed in the ritual and both were seated throughout. 
 We can conclude from the study that there is an observable difference in one’s experience 
of the ritual based on group membership. As the study concluded, it is “not enough to merely 
observe the ritual to show collective emotions experienced by the performers and their 
supporters. The observers must share membership in the group and have a relationship with at 
least one of the participants to share this tightly coupled group experience reflected in the heart 
rate dynamics” (Konvalinka et al., 2011, p. 8518). Membership in the group modulates one’s 
experience of the ritual itself. I want to suggest that this empirical data strengthens the 
phenomenological evidence of a we-mode of experience – even if it is at a pre-reflective and 
sentient level. 
 Furthermore, simple neurological mirroring cannot account for these findings. Just seeing 
the ritual or being present is insufficient to bring about the levels of synchronous arousal that the 
study found. The ritual is very arousing for everyone involved, and “[s]haring of emotions 
merely through mirroring is of course possible and expected in the other spectators as well” 
(Konvalinka et al., 2011, p. 8518). However, if the synchronous arousal were only the result of 
neurological mirroring, one would expect to find it in both groups of spectators. This is precisely 
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not the case. There is something happening to the participants and the related spectators that is 
not happening to non-related spectators.
7
  
Concluding on Conditions for Collective Experience 
Keeping the preceding phenomenological analyses and empirical data in mind, I now wish to 
return to the six proposals that began this article. My hope is to eliminate some and confirm 
others so that we may have  a clear conception of what it means to call an experience 
“communal.”  
 The first proposal was that each member of the group must have the experience in order 
for the experience to count as communal. In light of the preceding, it seems we should reject this. 
Whether or not a group has an experience is not, as we noted above, a question of numbers. 
What we ought to understand to be at stake instead is the fulfillment of rationally motivated 
sense content. Just so long as at least one member of the group has the properly motivated 
experience, it seems we can say that the group has the experience.  
There may be other good reasons to reject (i). First, it seems too narrow a way to define a 
group. In (i), it is just the fact of one’s being present for an event that constitutes one as part of 
the group. Imagine the socialist party has a meeting, and in this meeting, actions are taken that 
have an effect on the whole party. Say, for example, the party splits into three. I would like to 
say that the group upon whom this has an effect, and who share in the experience of the schism 
going forward, can include members of the party who were not present at the meeting. Second, I 
am inclined to believe that an experience can be a communal experience without affecting all 
members of a group. For example, if a political party wins its first seat in government. There can 
be a communal experience of joy even if one member is away and does not learn of the event 
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 Fischer, R. et. al. (2014) studies a Hindu fire-walking ritual and finds similar results, viz., that the level of 
one’s involvement in the ritual shapes one’s affective response to it.  
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until many weeks later. If (i) is the case, then there cannot, properly speaking, be a communal 
experience until every member of the group has the experience, and I find that counterintuitive. 
One who is deeply committed to (i) might try to salvage it with the following suggestion. 
It could be the case that (i) is a sufficient but not necessary condition for a communal experience. 
In other words, if each member of the community has the experience E, then the group has the 
experience. However, it is not the case that, if it is a single member fails to have E, then the 
community does not experience E. Here, I must admit that I have been somewhat sloppy in my 
use of language. What does it mean to say that each member of the group “has the experience?” 
If this means that the individual has, within her stream of conscious life, an experience of the 
fully motivated communal content, then it seems to me that (i) is a sufficient but not necessary 
condition for communal experience. However, we must recall that Stein insists that if any 
member’s stream of consciousness contains the properly motivated content, then this is sufficient 
for the community to have the experience. This makes (i)’s being true trivial in the following 
sense. If it is true that one member’s having the experience is sufficient for a communal 
experience, then surely it is true that every member’s having the experience is sufficient as well. 
It seems pedantic, then, to insist on the truth of (i) even as a sufficient condition.  
This brings us to (ii), that a subset of the group must have the experience in order for it to 
count as communal. I take it that this is obviously a necessary condition. If no members of the 
group have the experience, there is nothing to count as communal. Furthermore, I would claim 
that this is also a sufficient condition, assuming that “has the experience” is qualified as above. 
There is, I believe, a danger is trying to specify (ii) any further. We should not try to identify 
how large the subset of the group must be. As has been argued above, a group’s having an 
experience is not a question of reaching a critical mass of members who have the experience. 
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Furthermore, because many groups lacking formalized structures can both exist and be the 
bearers of experiences, I can see no good reason to identify the necessary group subset with any 
particular organizational or administrative roles. Group membership itself suffices.  
Let us now consider (iii). I argue that Stein’s phenomenology of communal experience 
and the empirical data garnered from the fire-walking ritual offer reason to accept the third 
proposal, which suggests that a communal experience is given in such a way that it is specifically 
qualified as “communal.” Stein’s analysis identifies plural noetic and noematic senses that are 
constitutive of communal experiences.  
Her analyses, in some sense, predict the results of the fire-walking study, which shows 
that there are distinctive patterns of arousal during the ceremony that are shared by members of 
the community – and members only. One way in which this might be further tested is by 
modifying the study performed at the fire-walking ritual. The same techniques could be used to 
measure the heart rate patters of participants and spectators while withholding group membership 
information from the scientists analyzing the data until their computations are complete. 
Theoretically, the scientists should be able to predict group membership based on patterns of 
arousal.  
I also believe that we should affirm (iv), albeit with some qualifications. This proposal 
claims that the experience is given in consciousness as belonging to a stream of experiences that 
is specifically the communal stream. The communal experience’s sense of belonging to a 
communal stream must not be construed as the individual “tapping into” a super-individual 
stream of consciousness of which she is a part. Rather, those experiences which we have “in the 
name of the group,” to use Stein’s expression,  belong to a group current of experience within the 
24 
 
individual stream of consciousness, and within that stream of consciousness, there is an 
identifiable current of experiences that belong to the group. 
Finally, there is good reason to reject (v). Only individuals, as far as we can tell, are 
centers of conscious experience. To affirm (v) is to commit the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness. Allow me explain what I mean. Imagine you come to visit me at Loyola 
Marymount University. I tell you that I am going to show you the university. I walk you through 
campus, show you the classrooms, the dorms, the library, the chapel, and the administrative 
offices. If, at the end of the tour, you reply, “That’s wonderful, but where’s the university? You 
showed me a bunch of buildings and people, but I never saw a university,” then you are 
committing this fallacy. Just as a university is a collection of buildings and people, communities 
are collections of individuals. There is no super-individual ego whose experiences are those of 
the group. There is no good evidence, empirical or phenomenological, for the existence of super-
individual egos.  
In conclusion, I have argued that in order for an experience to count as a communal 
experience it must meet the following three criteria. First, a subset of the group must have the 
experience. Secondly, the experience is one that is given in consciousness with plural noetic and 
noematic senses. The plural noetic sense is the sense of the experience that refers it back as 
belonging to a plurality of experiences rather than to a lone individual. The plural noematic sense 
identifies the content of the experience as shared. Also, the ideal correlate of this plural noematic 
content must be that which the experience rationally motivates. Third, the experiences can be 
said to belong to a communal current of experience so long as one does commit the error of 
granting the bearer of these experiences ontological independence. It seems that any theory that 
tries to solve the curious case of collective experience must meet these three conditions. 
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